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EXACTIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS
AFTER DOLAN V CITY OF TIGARD
I. INTRODUCTION
[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.!
Once we saw the black ribbon stretching to the horizon as the
solution to all our transportation problems.' As long as we could
make the road longer or wider, we could solve congestion with just a
bit more asphalt.3 Modem reality requires a variety of approaches
for commuting, shopping, and business travel. Transportation
corridors can promote efficiency, the formulation of comprehensive
planning and intermodal solutions, and the protection of fragile
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Before 1900 the demand to pave roadways came from bicyclists. ALAN BLACK,
URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 41 (1995). The first federal highway Act was
passed in 1916. Id. (citing Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 355.) Federal urban
highway programs began during World War II. Id. (citing Federal Highway Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 839, ch. 626.) Not until 1956, however, with the passage of the Interstate and
Defense Highway System Act, did construction begin on the project to connect all major
population centers. Sallie Gaines, The Roads That Changed America: Our Tale of the
Interstates is One of Vision, Politics and $116 Billion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1991, § 17
(Transportation), at 1, 5. President Eisenhower had admired the German autobahns while
serving as Allied commander-in-chief. Id. He saw in them not only an opportunity to
create a large number of jobs quickly after the end of the Korean conflict but also an
essential means for moving troops and equipment in national emergencies. Id.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145, added 23
U.S.C. § 134, introduced regional solutions by providing that federal funding be "based on
a continuing comprehensive transportation planning process." This section was amended
by the Intermodal Efficiency Surface Transportation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240,105
Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23, 49, and other titles of the
U.S.C.) to read that "transportation plans and programs for urbanized areas ... shall
provide for the development of transportation facilities (including pedestrian walkways and
bicycle transportation facilities) which will function as an intermodal transportation
system." 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (Supp. V 1993).
3. See, e.g., MELVIN M. WEBBER, ON STRATEGIES FOR TRANSPORT PLANNING 1
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Working Paper No. 100,1969)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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environmental and natural resources. 4 Traditional zoning techniques
may actually cause greater traffic congestion-resulting in energy
inefficiency and pollution production-by allowing large retail
developments that make public transportation impractical, and by
increasing the distance between residences and commercial struc-
tures.5
When society benefits from preserving existing land us-
es-residences, shops, vacant lots, and even entire neighbor-
hoods-property owners feel that society should bear the cost, not the
individual property owner.6 In 1987 the Court began to shift the
balance back toward private property rights In a series of decisions,
the Court has expressed and refined a test for takings analysis. In
Dolan v. City of Tigard,' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-
four majority, expanded the "essential nexus" test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.9 Nollan required that the exaction
sought by local government be substantially related to the harms
imposed by the development.' ° Now a simple nexus is no longer
sufficient; the municipality bears the legal burden of showing that the
exaction is roughly proportionate to the harm. However the Court,
by imposing the rough proportionality requirement on top of the
4. A working definition of a transportation corridor is:
[A] specific geographic area which includes: (1) the maximum right-of-way
required to meet the transportation needs generated by the projected population
and employment through the life of the corridor plan, and (2) all adjacent areas
which are affected by the transportation facility and are reasonably necessary to
accomplish the objectives established in the plan.
Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn, Transportation Corridors: Shaping and Financing
Urbanization Through Integration of Eminent Domain, Zoning and Growth Management
Techniques, 55 UMKC L. REV. 153, 156 (1987).
5. See Robert Cervero, Jobs-Housing Balancing and Regional Mobility, 55 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS'N 136, 139 (1989). The Southern California Association of Governments has
reduced its 1989 predictions to account for the economic downturn of the 1990s; yet, it still
predicts an ever increasing distance between centrally located housing and outlying
affordable housing in Southern California. See SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
GOVERNMENTS, REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND GUIDE, chs. 2-6 (May 1995).
6. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (finding property owner
sought variance from providing easement for floodplain and bike path in order to receive
redevelopment permit); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (finding
developer challenged required dedication of land for highway bordering subdivision).
7. See infra notes 64-123 and accompanying text.
8. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10. Id. at 837.
11. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
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essential nexus test, fails to allow city planners the flexibility necessary
to design creative solutions to reduce the negative impacts of regional
development.12
At first the concept of rough proportionality is seductive. Why
should any government possess the power to exact remedies not
directly related to the problems exacerbated by private development?
The reality is that city planning requires consideration of a larger area
than a single parcel. Neighborhoods and cities are vibrant, integral
units. Each new or more intensive use of a site creates a regional
impact. If the city fails to require the developer to mitigate the
burdens created, the cost for mitigation falls on the existing neighbor-
ing property owners. The city planner's goal is to ensure that each
development or improvement also contributes to the improvement of
the community at large. 3
Exactions fall on the party in the best position to absorb the
cost-the developer-who will, theoretically, realize a sizable profit
on the investment. 4 The alternative is to place a growing tax
burden on other property owners who are unable to externalize the
cost. This alternative not only raises issues of fairness but may also
destroy marginal businesses, thus adding to the blight of the neighbor-
hood.
15
The Court in Dolan rejected the city of Tigard's demand for a
bike path dedication. 6 Holding that the city had failed to establish
12. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF TRANSPORT & ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, URBAN TRAVEL AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 23 (1915) ("Difficult decisions will have to be made: the
planning of development, the cost of travel, the design of vehicles and management of
traffic will all have to change."); John Black, URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 21 (1981) ("There is a wide divergence of opinion on how to solve the
'urban transport problem', but the aim of transport planning is to search for the best
solutions given the resources available.").
13. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 3, at 2 ("[T]he accumulating research findings are
dramatizing the long-sensed fact that transportation facilities are integral subsystems within
the larger city systems and that personal travel and goods shipment are inextricably bound
up in the workings of modem societal systems.").
14. See Vickie Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 483, 493 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the
Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689 (1994) (concluding that
redevelopment projects designed to revitalize inner cities ignored local concerns and
contributed to decline of neighborhoods).
16. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
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that the path would alleviate the problems caused by increased car
trips to a much larger hardware store on the site, 7 the Court's new
addition to the takings analysis potentially cripples the necessary
flexibility of city planning. State and federal laws now support the
expanding view of alternative transportation options.t8 To ensure
that development is not merely economically sustainable but also
environmentally sustainable, municipalities must have the tools to
alter existing traffic options in favor of intermodal ones.
Part II of this Note examines the history of exactions and
regulatory takings. Part III examines the background of Dolan and
the basis for the decision. By examining the cases used to refine the
test, Part IV seeks to determine how the Court will apply the test to
future factual situations. Part V analyzes the holding in light of the
equities involved and the need for alternative solutions to existing
problems. Part VI concludes that the Court should use rough
proportionality only to ensure that the exactions imposed on
developments do not wildly exceed the burdens imposed. The test
should not be used to tie the hands of city planners.
II. HISTORY OF EXACTIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole. 9
A. Physical Invasions and Regulatory Takings
As far back as Pumpelly'v. Green Bay Company," the Court
established that the permanent physical invasion of a property right
constituted a compensable taking.2 In Pumpelly, a dam constructed
17. Id. at 2321-22.
18. See, e.g., James W. Spensley, New Clean Air Regulations: Limiting Transportation
Development Options, 23 COLO. LAW. 1099 (1994) (urging that local communities must
develop alternative transportation options); Robert E. Yuhnke, The Amendments to
Reform Transportation Planning in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,5 TUL. ENVTL.
LJ. 239 (1991) (noting the federal statute will require the development of alternative
transportation options).
19. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
20. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
21. The Court noted that improvements to roads or waterways were intended to
benefit the public; thus, any consequential damages resulting from the improvements were
not compensable takings. Id. at 180-81. But "where real estate is actually invaded by
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downriver of the subject property caused permanent flooding of the
site and destruction of the property's value Seventy years later the
Court held that frequent takeoffs and landings by military aircraft at
low altitudes that forced chicken farmers to abandon their business
constituted a physical invasion.' The Court more recently upheld
the physical invasion standard in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.,24 in which a local regulation requiring landlords to
allow installation of cable television junction boxes on their property
was held to effect a compensable taking.'
The Court has upheld regulatory takings-restrictions by the
municipality on the use of property-as a proper application of the
police power.26 After the citizens of Kansas amended their constitu-
tion in 1880 to forbid the manufacture and sale of alcohol,27 two
brewery owners were sued for continuing a nuisance in violation of
the amendment.28 They brought suit for compensation, claiming that
the state's action caused their breweries to lose all or most of their
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial
structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking,
within the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 181. The government must compensate
the owner despite the weight of the justification for the invasion. Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
22. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 176-77.
23. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945). The Court held that the flights were
below the navigable airspace that Congress placed in the public domain and thus imposed
a servitude on the property. Id. at 264-67. However, the flights must be both so low and
so frequent that they cause a "direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land" to constitute a taking. Id at 266.
24. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
25. Id.
26. The term police power is defined very broadly.
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case
must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither
abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation ....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the
police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
27. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624 (1887).
28. Id.
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value.29 The Court held that the police powers of a state-those that
regulate the health, safety, and welfare of the public-are subjects
over which the federal government has no power.30 The police
powers allow the abatement of a nuisance, even when the value of the
property is destroyed.31 Such actions do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is not incompatible with the principle "that all
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."32
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of
property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition
of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes
depreciated, is very different from taking property for public
use, or from depriving a person of his property without due
process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated;
in the other, unoffending property is taken from an innocent
owner.
33
Later cases found the Court upholding regulations that effectively
prohibited the legitimate existing uses of property, including a livery
stable,34 a brick yard, 5 a grove of cedar trees,
6 a gold mine,37
and a gravel pit.38 In the words of Justice Holmes, "[t]he general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."39
Holmes held invalid a regulation prohibiting coal mining that might
cause surface subsidence, even if it allowed the destruction of a home
29. Id. at 654.
30. Id. at 658-59 (citing The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847)).
31. id. at 658.
32. Id. at 665.
33. Id. at 669.
34. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
35. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
36. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). The red cedar trees were ordered
destroyed to prevent the spread of cedar rust, which was fatal to apple trees in a nearby
orchard. Id. at 277. The statute provided compensation for the expense incurred for
felling the trees, but not for the value of the standing trees or the decrease in the
property's market value. Id. The exercise of the police power was justified by the threat
to a more valuable resource. Id. at 279-80.
37. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
38. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The statute prohibited any
excavations below the water table, effectively ending a business that had operated for 31
years. Id. at 595-96.
39. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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built above the ore.' Sixty-five years later, in Keystone Bituminous
Coal, the Court sought to reconcile Holmes' view with a separate line
of cases that upheld similar regulations.4 Where Justice Holmes saw
the earlier statute as wrongfully restoring rights freely contracted
away,42 the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal found the new act
was a public, not a private, benefit as it applied to all the surface
lands overlying coal fields.43 The public goal was "'conservation of
40. Id. at 414-16. Pennsylvania law was'unique in considering subsurface support as
a separate interest from the surface or mineral estate. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987). As a practical matter, the "support estate" is
always owned by the owner of one of the other two estates. Id. at 500-01. During the
period from 1890 through 1920, approximately 90% of the support estate in the bituminous
coal fields of western Pennsylvania was severed from the surface estate. Id. at 478. The
Mahons, who had purchased only the surface on which they built their home, sought an
injunction under the Kohler Act of 1921, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 661 (1966), which
prohibited mining that would cause subsidence under structures. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
260 U.S. at 412. The Court accepted the mining company's argument that the Kohler Act
was not a bona fide action under the state's police powers but legislation designed to
increase the property rights of a few homeowners. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S.
at 482-83. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pennsylvania Coal Co., summarized the nuisance
exception to compensable takings:
Coal in place is land; and the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute.
He may not so use it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless,
may, owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.
Whenever they do, the legislature has power to prohibit such uses without
paying compensation.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. 417 (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
41. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.21 (Supp.
1995) [hereinafter Bituminous Subsidence Act], to remedy the failings of the state's
existing subsidence statutes. Id. at 474. The Act prohibited the mining of coal that would
cause subsidence in public buildings, residences, and cemeteries that existed when the
legislation was enacted. Id. at 476. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources promulgated regulations requiring that at least 50% of the coal beneath the
listed land uses must be left in place to provide surface support. Id. at 476-77. The Court
distinguished the Subsidence Act from the Kohler Act due to the legislature's explicit
finding in the former that the" 'act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers
of the Commonwealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the
people.'" Id. at 485 (quoting Bituminous Subsidence Act, supra § 1406.2). The Kohler
Act was held by Holmes to benefit a few private parties since it did not apply to land
whose surface was owned by the coal companies. Id. at 486 (quoting Bituminous
Subsidence Act, supra § 1406.2).
42. The Court has interpreted the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, to
invalidate acts intended to repudiate existing debtor-creditor relationships, not to override
the states' police power. Keystone Bituminous Coal at 502-03 (citing Manigault v. Springs,
199 U.S. 473, 480 (1930)). Protection of health, morals, and welfare was deemed
paramount to rights granted in contracts between individuals. Id.
43. Keystone Bituminous Coal at 486.
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surface land areas,"'" which the Court considered a valid exercise
of the police power.4' Had the act eliminated all economically viable
use of the land, the state would have committed a compensable
regulatory taking. 6 Petitioners claimed a taking based on the
estimated twenty-seven million tons of coal the association could not
mine as a result of the restrictions.47 But that quantity of coal
represented less than two percent of the petitioners' total potentially
minable coal.' None of the mines had shown an operating loss as
a result of the regulation;49 therefore, the coal operations were
economically viable enterprises.5
In holding that the two percent was inseparable from the entire
volume of coal owned by the mining companies, the Court relied on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City."' In Penn
Central, the city, under an historical landmark preservation statute,
had prevented the owners of Grand Central Terminal from construct-
ing a fifty-story office tower above the historical building."2 The
Court rejected the owners' takings claim, refusing to consider the air
rights as severable from the remainder of the full block parcel under
a takings analysis. 3 The owners could continue to use the terminal,
which produced revenue,' and could sell or transfer the air rights to
other nearby sites.5
A physical invasion of private property by the government, or its
agent, will always constitute a taking.56 For a regulatory taking
count to succeed, however, the plaintiff must allege not only an
44. Id. at 485 (quoting Bituminous Subsidence Act, supra note 41, § 1406.2).
45. Id.
46. ld.
47. Id. at 496.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50.' Ia at 497.
51. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
52. Id. at 116-19.
53. "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."
Id. at 130.
54. Id. at 135.
55. kd at 136-37.
56. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
The Court added that this type of physical invasion will constitute a taking "without regard
to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner." Id.
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almost complete destruction of economically viable use of the
property, but that destruction must affect the broadest possible
definition of the extent of the property
B. Exactions, From Subdivisions to Redevelopment
Subdividing a piece of property can greatly ,increase its value.
But the same increase in land use density that generates the greater
value also creates a burden on the local infrastructure. 58 Courts
since the 1920s have upheld subdivision exactions as a means of
ameliorating these burdens.59 These exactions are not a taking or an
act of eminent domain because they are "reasonable and necessary for
the public welfare" and are granted in exchange for the privilege of
recording the developer's plat.' However, the municipality's
exaction must conform with the state's enabling legislation.6
57. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. 470 (holding two percent of the coal
that the company could not mine under the regulations was not severable from remaining
98% in order to establish a compensable taking); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (holding
marketable air rights not severable from property and structure value for takings analysis).
58. The Court addressed this burden/benefit reasoning in Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S.
548 (1897). In 1893 Congress passed an act to plot the continuation of major thorough-
fares in the District of Columbia outside the existing boundaries of the cities of
Washington and Georgetown. Id. at 551. Where the extensions passed through existing
subdivisions, the government was required to pay for the land it condemned, half coming
from the government and half from an assessment of 'those lands bordering the
thoroughfares for the benefit they would receive from the roadway. Id. at 558.
59. Michigan upheld an exaction to widen existing streets to conform with their
dimensions recorded in the city's general plan in Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit,
217 N.W. 58, 60 (Mich. 1928). The New York courts first upheld an exaction for parkland
within a proposed subdivision in In re Lake Secor Development Co., 252 N.Y.S. 809, 812
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
60. Ridgefield Land Co., 217 N.W. at 60; see Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West
Orange, 198 A. 225, 229 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1938) (the state possesses the inherent authority-it
antedates the Constitution-to resort, in the building and expansion of its community life,
to such measures as may be necessary to secure the essential common material and moral
needs.... A comprehensive scheme of physical development is requisite to community
efficiency and progress; see also Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 644, 484 P.2d 606, 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639 (1971) (the rationale of the cases
affirming constitutionality... [is] that the subdivider realizes a profit from governmental
approval of a subdivision since his land is rendered more valuable by the fact of
subdivision, and in return for this benefit the city may require him to dedicate a portion
of his land for park purposes whenever the influx of new residents will increase the need
for park and recreational facilities.).
61. See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. Unitarian Church, 436 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1968) (holding that lack of constitutional, statutory, or charter authorization for
required dedication of easement without compensation in order to record plat violates
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With diminishing funds available for land condemnation and
capital improvements, cities have imposed a wide variety of in lieu
fees on proposed subdivisions.62 The fees imposed may go beyond
the immediate impact of the development to alleviate regional
problems exacerbated by the development.63
C. Modern Takings Analysis
The beginnings of the modem trend in takings analysis were
apparent in Keystone Bituminous Coal.'4 Justices Powell, O'Connor,
and Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent.65 Finding
little difference between the two Pennsylvania statutes," the Chief
Justice distinguished the Subsidence Act from the Court's historical
analysis of nuisance statutes, which avoided a takings problem by
"rest[ing] on discrete and narrow purposes." 67 But more important-
ly, the dissent considered the twenty-seven million tons of coal
takings clause).
62. See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions:
From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 69 (1987); Charles Siemon,
Who Bears the Cost?, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (1987). In a case remanded three
days after the Court decided Dolan, the Court signalled that in lieu fees for sports facilities
and public art would receive heightened scrutiny after the Dolan decision. Ehrlich v. City
of Culver City, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731
(1994).
63. In dictum, the California Supreme Court noted:
It is difficult to see why, in the light of the need for recreational facilities.., and
the increasing mobility of our population, a subdivider's fee in lieu of dedication
may not be used to purchase or develop land some distance from the subdivision
but which would also be available for use by subdivision residents. If, for
example, the governing body of a city has determined... that a specific amount
of park land is required for a stated number of inhabitants, if this determination
is reasonable, and there is a park already developed close to the subdivision to
meet the needs of its residents, it seems reasonable to employ the fee to
purchase land in another area of the city for park purposes to maintain the
proper balance between the number of persons in the community and the
amount of park land available.
Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 640 n.6, 484 P.2d at 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636
n.6.
64. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
65. Id. at 506-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 507-08 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that the legislature
passed the Kohler Act to eradicate public evils including wrecked streets, collapsed
buildings, broken pipelines, and loss of human life-all recognized by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491,492 (Pa.), rev'd, 260 U.S.
393 (1922)).
67. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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separately from the remaining coal.' Disdaining the majority's
determination that this challenge was to a regulatory taking, not a
physical invasion, the Chief Justice concluded the distinction was
irrelevant when discussing the impact on property rights. 9 While a
physical invasion will always destroy the full bundle of property rights,
the impact of a regulation may destroy only one or more of the
individual sticks in that bundle.70
Chief Justice Rehnquist returned to the nuisance rationale that
serves as a basis for most land use and environmental law, finding
that at most it serves as an exemption to compensable takings for two
reasons.7 First, the Court recognized that nuisance regulations had
"discrete and narrow purposes" justifying the governmefit's right to
exercise its police power.72 Second, and more important in light of
the dissent's conclusion that the twenty-seven million tons of coal
were a separate interest from the remainder, the Court has previously
upheld regulations that have dramatically reduced the value of a
parcel but has never upheld one that has extinguished the entire
value.7' By defining the coal that the companies could not mine as
a distinct property interest, the Chief Justice had no trouble determin-
ing that the Subsidence Act was a compensable taking.74
68. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
69. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice cited Causby in which
the continuous takeoffs and landings over the chicken farm were held as much a taking
as if the government "had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it." Id. at 516 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
70. Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, C.i., dissenting).
71. Id. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice cited Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), in which the regulation prohibited excavation below
the water table in order to protect ground water supplies; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915), concerning a regulation that prohibited the operation of a brickyard
within city limits; and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), where a countywide
prohibition act forced the closure of local distilleries. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S.
at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice referred to Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), in which a regulation mandating
the owner of diseased red cedar trees to destroy his trees did not extinguish the value of
his land because he could still salvage their value as lumber. Keystone Bituminous Coal,
480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Even when the local government enjoined
the entire enterprise, as in Goldblatt, Hadacheck, and Mugler, the land retained some
value. Id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 520-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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1. Nollan and essential nexus
The Nollans owned a small beach cottage in a strip of private
residences located between two public beaches.' They sought to
replace the structure with a three-bedroom house.76 The Coastal
Commission (Commission) approved the permit contingent upon the
Nollans granting a public easement to the beach between the high
tide line and their existing concrete seawall." When challenged, the
Commission justified this exaction as necessary to prevent a solid wall
of two-story residences from creating a psychological barrier to the
public.78 The Commission reasoned that if the public could not see
the beach, then it could not realize that it had a right to pass below
the high tide line between 'the two public beaches.79 After the
Commission promulgated its regulations, it approved forty-three
shoreline development permits in the same tract, each one carrying
the same dedication as the Nollans'.'
The California Court of Appeal upheld the dedication as
sufficiently related to the burden created, even if the burden was a
cumulative one not created solely by the Nollans' home.8 Further,
the court held that the regulation did not deprive the Nollans of all
reasonable use of their property.'
75. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
76. Id. at 828.
77. Id. Under the California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-
30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995), any development within the coastal zone required a
permit from the commission. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30600 (West 1986).
78. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 829.
81. Id. at 830 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719,723-
24,223 Cal. Rptr. 28,30-31 (1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)). The court of appeal relied
on an earlier case, Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578 (1985), in which the court upheld a similar exaction because "[r]espondent's
beach front home [was] one more brick in the wall separating the People of California
from the state's tidelands." Id. at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The court in Grupe also
noted that while "a particular development need not create the need for a particular
exaction, we believe Associated Home Builders does require that the exaction be designed
to meet needs to which the project contributes, at least in an incidental manner." Id. at
166 n.11, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589 n.11 (referring to Associated Home Builders v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971)).
82. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830.
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The Supreme Court reversed.' Justice Scalia, writing for the
five-person majority, began by noting that if the Commission had
required the Nollans to dedicate the beachfront easement without
conditioning it on a building permit, then that action would constitute
a taking.' However, the majority assumed, without deciding, that
the Commission's purposes were valid.' They further assumed that
the Commission could deny the permit unless the denial so drastically
interfered with the Nollans' use of their property that the action itself
constituted a taking.86 Had the Commission proposed an exaction
that protected the public's right to view the ocean, the Court would
have upheld it.' But the required dedication of access to the
beachfront lacked an "essential nexus'! to the Commission's stated
purpose.' Justice Scalia rejected the comparison between visual
access and physical access, deeming it a mere play on words.89
Without an essential nexus between the harm caused and the exaction




Justice Scalia had another opportunity to narrow the takings
analysis in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.9' David Lucas
purchased two residential lots on a barrier island intending to build
single family residences.' After he purchased the lots, South
Carolina passed the Beachfront Management Act,93 which effectively
83. Id. at 842.
84. Id. at 831. Justice Scalia rejected Justice Brennan's contention that such an
easement could constitute "a mere restriction" on the use of the property. Id. Relying
on Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), Justice Scalia reiterated the importance of the
right to exclude others from one's property. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
85. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 836. Justice Scalia suggested height or width restrictions as legitimate means
of fulfilling the Commission's purpose. Id. Even a permanent easement for public access
on the Nollans' property that would allow passersby to still view the ocean would pass
constitutional muster. Id.
88. Id. at 837.
89. Id. at 838.
90. Id. at 837.
91. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
92. Id. at 2889.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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prohibited all construction on either lot.94 Lucas filed suit seeking
compensation, and the trial court held the statute had destroyed "'any
reasonable economic use of the lots.' 95
Justice Scalia examined the "harmful or noxious uses" standard
applied in early Court takings decisions. 96 He found the nuisance
test was equivalent to the modem takings analysis as stated in Agins
v. City of Tiburon,' namely that "'land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state inter-
ests." ' "9' Justice Scalia noted that a court could read the regulation
either as harm preventing and therefore not compensable, or benefit
conferring and compensable.' Which reading a given court applies
to the regulation "depends primarily upon one's evaluation of the
worth of competing uses of real estate."" Rejecting noxious use as
an objective criterion," the majority returned to the bundle of
rights an owner gains upon acquiring title."°  All owners must
anticipate some use restrictions on their property under a lawful
exercise of the police power. °3 However, if a statute is enacted
after the owner acquires title, and that statute destroys all economical-
ly valuable use, then that statute has effected a taking of the
property. 4  If the owner's proposed use would constitute a nui-
sance to neighboring properties, the state could then enjoin the use
without employing inverse condemnation.0  Such a proposed use
was always unlawful, even if the state had not explicitly proscribed
it.1
06
The new test for a total taking of property must include an
analysis of the harm posed to neighboring properties, the appropriate-
94. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. The act allowed Lucas to construct a walkway or small
deck on the site. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 485 (S.C. 1992).
95. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)).
96. Id. at 2897-99.
97. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
98. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S.
at 260)).
99. Id. at 2898.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2899.
102. Id.
103. It
104. Id. at 2900.
105. Id. at 2900-01.
106. Id. at 2901.
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ness of the proposed use for the particular site, and any possible
mitigation measures." On remand, the state was instructed to
identify nuisance principles under state law, which would meet the
new standard, or grant Lucas's petition for compensation.0 8
Four justices filed separate opinions, reviewing the same briefs,
yet finding a seemingly different set of facts. Justice Kennedy felt it
necessary to examine the reasonableness of Lucas's expectations."°
Justice Blackmun noted that during half of the previous forty
years the two lots in question were either part of the beach or flooded
twice daily at high tide."' In fact, both lots were completely
submerged between 1957 and 1963.1 After Lucas moved to the
island and before he purchased the two lots, the homes in the area
required repeated sandbagging and construction of two seawalls to
protect them from the encroaching ocean.'1 2 The South Carolina
statute included a finding that beachfront construction had, among
other effects, "accelerated erosion[ ] and threatened adjacent proper-
ty,,,113 thereby acting as a private nuisance under the majority's
scheme." 4
Next, Justice Blackmun challenged the majority's characterization
of the property's state as valueless."' Justice Blackmun argued that
the owner could still use the site to camp, live in a tent or movable
trailer, swim, or picnic."6 The owner could also sell the property,
which would have value to neighbors as protection for their own
property."7  Finally, Lucas retained the right favored by both
Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice, the right under Kaiser Aetna v.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2901-02. On remand the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
Coastal Council was unable to establish an nuisance action that would justify the taking,
and remanded the case to the trial court solely for determination of damages. Lucas, 424
S.E.2d at 486.
109. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903.
110. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994)).
114. Id. at 2905-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "If the state legislature is correct that
the prohibition on building in front of the setback line prevents serious harm, then, under
this Court's prior cases, the Act is constitutional." Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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United States to exclude others."' If the gravel pit in Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead"9 and the shuttered brickyard in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian"° retained residual value, then Justice Blackmun had no
trouble finding such value in Lucas's lots.'
2'
Justice Stevens, after finding no support for the majority in the
Court's past decisions,"z predicted that the new test "will, I fear,
greatly hamper the efforts of local officials and planners who must
deal with increasingly complex problems in land-use and environmen-
tal regulation.... [T]hese officials face both substantial uncertainty
because of the ad hoc nature of takings law and unacceptable
penalties if they guess incorrectly about that law."'
III. DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
A. Expanding a Hardware Store in Six Easy Years
[Q]uestions arising under the Just Compensation Clause rest
on ad hoc factual inquiries, and must be decided on the facts
and circumstances in each case.'24
Florence Dolan owns a chain of plumbing and hardware supply
stores,"z including the 9700 square foot A-Boy Electric and Plumb-
ing Supply store located at 12520 SW Main Street in the Central
Business District of Tigard, Oregon.16 The existing structure dates
from the late 1940s. 7 Tigard is a city of some 30,000 residents on
the outskirts of Portland." The store is located on a 1.67 acre lot
that also includes a thirty-nine space paved parking lot that covers
118. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979)).
119. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
120. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
121. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
125. Brief for Respondent at 1, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-
518) [hereinafter Respondent Brief].
126. Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. G at G-6 to -9, Dolan (No. 93-518) [hereinafter
Petition for Certiorari].
127. Id. at G-8.
128. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at 1.
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forty percent of the property.29 Main Street marks the southern
boundary of the property, and Fanno Creek crosses the southwestern
corner marking the western boundary of the site. 3 '
In 1989 Mr. and Mrs. Dolan applied to redevelop their proper-
ty. 3' The City approved the design subject to conditions the Dolans
found unacceptable. 132  They appealed to the Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA), 3 which rejected their takings challenge as not
ripe for review." 4 The Dolans had failed to seek a variance from
the City.
135
In March 1991 the Dolans made a virtually identical application
to the City including a variance request. 136 The proposal included
razing the existing store, constructing a new 17,600 square foot
hardware store, and paving a thirty-nine car parking lot.137 Future
plans for the site consisted of a separate structure to house rental
businesses and an expansion of the parking lot.138
In compliance with Oregon's Comprehensive Land Use Manage-
ment Program, 39 Tigard adopted a comprehensive plan in its
Community Development Code (CDC). 4° Properties located in the
Central Business District must leave at least a fifteen percent
greenway, so that structures and pavement will not cover more than
eighty-five percent of the site.'41 The site is also located within the
Action Area Overlay Zoning District.42 To reduce street conges-
129. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Dolan (No. 93-518) [hereinafter Petitioner Briefi.
130. Id.
131. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at 3.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Oregon law grants LUBA exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals of land use
decisions. Dunn v. City of Redmond, 735 P.2d 609, 610 (Or. 1987).
134. Petitioner Brief, supra note 129, at 7 n.1.
135. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, app. D at D-4 (citing Dolan v. City of
Tigard, Or. LUBA No. 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)).
136. 1&
137. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
138. Id. at 2313-14.
139. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1991).
140. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
141. Id. (citing TIGARD, OR., COMMUNITY DEV. CODE ch. 18.66 (ref. 1994))
[hereinafter CDC].
142. Petitioner Brief, supra note 129, at G-17 to -21 (citing CDC, supra note 141, ch.
18.86). The Action Area Overlay zone was repealed by Ordinance No. 91-30 (Oct. 8,
1991), but at the time of the application it required only dedication of the right of way, not
construction of the bike path. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at 12 (citing CDC ch.
18.86.040.A.l.b). In order to require construction of the bike path, the City had to find
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tion, the City adopted a city-wide system of pedestrian and bike paths
as part of its Congestion Management Plan. 43 The bike path routes
were written into the general plan, and any new development on a
property containing a planned bike path was required to dedicate that
portion of the property for use as a bike path.' 44 The general plan
included a bike path cutting across the Dolans' property running
parallel to Fanno Creek. 45
The City's Comprehensive Plan recognizes that automobile trips
"will remain the most dominant source of transportation."'
4 6
Although approximately forty miles of sidewalks or bike paths existed
in Tigard in 1991, bikes were used primarily for recreation.
41
Existing bike paths were concentrated around schools and new
subdivisions.'" However, the plan did foresee the bicycle and
pedestrian pathways possibly replacing some short automobile trips
for shopping purposes. 49  The City's bike path plan supplemented
the Washington County Bicycle Pedestrian Pathway Master Plan,
which was adopted in 1974.50 The major obstacle for implementing
that the development would "principally benefit" from the improvement. Id. (citing CDC,
supra note 141, ch. 18.164.110.B). There was no such finding for the subject property. Id.
143. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, app. A at A-9 to -14.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id. at A-4 (quoting City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation
Assumptions II(1) at 1-221).
147. Id. at A-6 (citing City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation
Assumptions 11(1) at 1-256).
148. Id. (citing City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation Assumptions 1(1)
at 1-221).
149. Id. at A-5 (citing City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation
Assumptions II(1) at 1-221).
150. Ld. at A-9 to -10 (citing City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation
Assumptions 11(1) at 1-267). The county commissioners finance bike paths through a one
percent tax on retail gasoline sales. Possible bike path locations are evaluated by their
potential:
1. To reduce hazards that exist on present roads;
2. To provide safe access to schools, recreation areas and major shopping
areas;
3. To develop the possibility of walking to school rather than riding, thereby
eliminating some school bus transportation;
4. To serve the greatest number of potential users;
5. To provide safety for walkers and bike riders to summer activities which
require transportation by auto; and
6. [ ]To establish pedestrian access to mass transportation.
Id. at A-10 (quoting City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation Assumptions
II(1) at 1-267 to 1-268).
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this master plan was the lack of public funds for acquiring right-of-
ways.' The bike path along Fanno Creek would connect the
hardware store on Main Street with the Civic Center and the primary
employment corridor along Hall Boulevard. 5
Fanno Creek floods seasonally in Tigard.'53 The City adopted
a Master Drainage Plan in 1981, which contained improvements to the
creek bed, including excavation next to Mrs. Dolan's site and
restrictions on impervious construction adjacent to the creek.'
1 4
Increased runoff from structures or paved lots would cause greater
rates of flow during storms.5 5 All property owners share the costs
for these improvements, with those adjacent to the creek paying more
for the greater benefit they realize.'56
The Dolans' proposed development was within the specified
zoning for the site, and the City Planning Commission gave condition-
al approval subject to the requirements of the CDC.'57 These
requirements specified that those portions of the Dolans' property
falling within and adjacent to the 100-year storm floodplain of Fanno
Creek be dedicated for a protective greenway.58 Part of that
greenway was to include a pedestrian and bike path in accord with the
general plan.159  The greenway exaction amounted to roughly ten
151. Id. at A-8 (quoting City of Tigard's Comprehensive Plan, Transportation
Assumptions 11(1) at 1-258). A voter-approved bond issue in 1989 allotted $364,000 for
bike path construction. Id. at 11-12, 12 n.3 (citing City of Tigard's Public Facilities Plan
at 16). A 1991 capital improvement plan allocated a further $455,000 for pedestrian or
bike path improvements. Id. (citing City of Tigard's Public Facilities Plan at 16).
152. Id. at 12.
153. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 439 (Or. 1993) (citing City of Tigard
Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC at 13, 20-21, reprinted in Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 126, at G-24 [hereinafter Commission Order]).
154. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at 8.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 9 (citing CDC, supra note 141, chs. 18.84, 18.86, 18.164.100).
157. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437,439 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
158. The 100-year floodplain, as determined by the Army Corps of Engineers, consists
of all land lying below 150 feet above sea level. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126,
at G-43. The city's greenway dedication requirement extends 15 feet from the floodplain
onto the adjacent property. Id. The new hardware store would be built at 152.5 feet
above sea level, thus potentially benefitting from all measures taken to reduce local
flooding. Id. at G-9, G-43 to -44.
159. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 439.
266 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:247
percent of the property."W The property owner generally bears the
cost of constructing the bike path.
The Dolans filed for a variance from these conditions.62 They
contended that the dedication was a taking under both the Oregon
and U.S. Constitutions.63 The planned development necessitated
building on part of the land required for dedication."6 Additionally,
they argued that no park existed for the bike path to access. 65
They did not propose other measures to mitigate the impact of their
development."6  The CDC permits variances only when a literal
interpretation of the zoning would cause "an undue or unnecessary
hardship."'67 Applying this standard, the Commission rejected the
requested variance."~ In doing so the Commission found it reason-
able to assume that customers and employees could use the required
bike path for both transportation and recreation. 6 9 The site plan
included a bike rack. 7 Further, the Commission found that the
bike path could "offset some of the traffic demand on ... nearby
streets and lessen the increase in traffic.""' The longterm plan for
160. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
161. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, app. B at B-63 (citing CDC, supra note 141, ch.
18.164.110.B).
162. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
163. The City never sought, nor had authority to seek, a transfer of the right of way in
fee simple. The exaction sought a dedication of an easement. Respondent Brief, supra
note 125, at B-8 (citing CDC, supra note 141, ch. 18.32.250.E2); see Portland Baseball Club
v. City of Portland, 18 P.2d 811, 812 (Or. 1933) ("In this state the rule is that, where land
has been dedicated or appropriated for a public street, the fee in the street remains in the
original owner subject only to the public easement, and, upon the vacation of the street,
it reverts to the owner of the abutting premises freed from the easement.").
164. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at G-28 (citing City of Tigard Resolution
No. 91-66).
165. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, app. E at E-4 (citing Site Development Review
Application, Statement of Justification for Variance (Mar. 26, 1991)).
166. Id.
167. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314 (citing CDC, supra note 141, § 18.134.010).
168. Id.
169. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 439.
170. Id.
171. Commission Order, supra note 153, at G-24. The City found that:
"[TJhe dedication and pathway construction are reasonably related to the
applicant's request to intensify the development of this site with a general retail
sales use, at first, and other uses to be added later. It is reasonable to assume
that customers and employees of the future uses of this site could utilize a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation
and recreation needs. * * * In addition, the proposed expanded use of this site
is anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing
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development envisioned an extensive and continuous pathway system,
which a variance that allowed for construction over the designated
right-of-way would jeopardize.72 The City found that the proposed
development would generate an additional 937 car trips per week.
173
The Commission also found that the dedication of the floodplain
was reasonably related to the increased use of the site." "The
development, which creates the need, should be responsible for
providing the City with the necessary data for making sound
decisions. The burden is on the applicant to prove that a project will
not adversely affect the environment or create undue future liabilities
for the City."'75 Paving the gravel parking lot, combined with the
almost doubled area of the roof, would increase storm water flow into
Fanno Creek thereby adding to the City's flood control needs.
176
The City's Master Drainage Plan apportions costs to property
owners as direct or indirect benefits.1' Properties adjoining the
congestion on nearby collector and arterial streets. Creation of a convenient,
safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation
could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion."
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 855 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994) (quoting Commission Order, supra note 153, at G-24).
172. The City's order suggested that all future requests for improvements in designated
areas must provide exactions for the floodplain greenway and the bikepath:
"It is imperative that a continuous pathway be developed in order for the paths
to function as an efficient, convenient, and safe system. Omitting a planned for
section of the pathway system, as the variance would result in if approved, would
conflict with Plan purposes and result in an incomplete system that would not
be efficient, convenient, or safe. The requested variance therefore would conflict
with the City's adopted policy of providing a continuous pathway system
intended to serve the general public good and therefore fails to satisfy the first
variance approval criterion.
"As noted above, approval of the variance request would have an adverse effect
on the existing partially completed pathway system because a system cannot fully
function with missing pieces. If this planned for section is omitted from the
pathway system, the system in this area will be much less convenient and
efficient. If the pedestrian and bicycle traffic is forced onto City streets at this
point in the pathway system because of this missing section, pedestrian and
bicycle safety will be lessened."
Dolan, 854 P.2d at 445-46 (Peterson, J., dissenting) (quoting Commission Order, supra note
153, at G-26 to -27).
173. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at G-14 to -15.
174. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
175. Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at A-19, A-21 (quoting TIGARD, OR.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN § 3.2 FLOODPLAINS).
176. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
177. Petitioner Brief, supra note 129, at 8-9.
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creek bed receive the direct benefit from reduced flooding.'78 Other
property owners benefit indirectly from the lack of flooded roads and
the subsequent limitations on emergency services. 9 The City only
required that the new construction not encroach upon the floodplain,
which would limit the City's ability to make future improvements for
flood control."m The City planned to construct and maintain a
landscaped buffer between the new bike path and the commercial
development.18" '
The Dolans appealed to the LUBA based on the lack of a nexus
between the proposed development and the exaction." LUBA
assumed the City's findings were supported by substantial evi-
dence.'83 The City found that the larger store and parking lot would
generate more car trips by customers and employees, and the
Commission found a "'reasonable relationship'" between the
increased traffic generated and the bike path, which would serve as
an alternate form of transportation." 4 LUBA also found a reason-
able relationship between the increased runoff caused by the new
construction and the greenway exaction."
The court of appeals rejected the Dolans' argument that Nollan
required an essential nexus between the impacts and conditions of
development. 86 The supreme court failed to establish a standard
178. Id. at 9.
179. Id. at 8-9.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
182. Id. at 2315.
183. Id.
184. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at D-16 (citing Dolan, Or. LUBA No. 91-
161). LUBA concluded that the reasonable relationship test was correct under both the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 18 of the Oregon Constitution.
Id. at D-11 (citing Dolan, Or. LUBA No. 91-161). LUBA explained "'[t]he "reasonable
relationship" standard is somewhere between the more extreme standards followed by
courts in a few jurisdictions which require that the need for a development exaction be
"specifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed development, or that a
development exaction merely have "some relationship" to the proposed development.'"
Dolan, 832 P.2d at 854 (quoting Dolan, Or. LUBA No. 91-161, quoting Parks v. Watson,
716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the reasonable relationship
test after Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), in Commercial
Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
185. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
186. Dolan, 832 P.2d at 855.
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for the third inquiry in Nollan,'8 ' the relationship between the
impact of the development and the exaction sought."s In rejecting
the petitioners' demand for a more stringent standard under the Fifth
Amendment, the court relied on Commercial Builders v. City of
Sacramento"8 9 as the controlling case law in the Ninth Circuit."
The court found that the argument for a "'substantial relationship"'
or" 'essential nexus'" was based on language found in the second, not
the third, prong of the Nollan test.'91 The reasonable relation was
satisfied by LUBA's finding that the bike path was reasonably
calculated to alleviate traffic congestion and provide for greater
nonvehicular access to the area.' 92 The court dismissed arguments
that the exaction was an invasion of the property affecting it as a
whole, or alternately that it denied all economically viable use of the
land.193
The Dolans appealed on the issue of the correct standard,
arguing that an essential nexus or substantial relationship was
required. 94 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' interpretation of the Nollan test. 95 The court reviewed the
necessity that the land use regulation, in order to not effect a taking,
had to substantially advance a legitimate state interest and not deny
187. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987).
The Commission claims ... that we may sustain the condition at issue here by
finding that it is reasonably related to the public need or burden that the
Nollans' new house creates or to which it contributes. We can accept, for
purposes of discussion, the Commission's proposed test as to how close a "fit"
between the condition and the burden is required, because we find that this case
does not meet even the most untailored standards.
Id.
188. See Dolan, 832 P.2d at 854.
189. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
190. Dolan, 832 P.2d at 855.
191. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court determined that the "essential nexus" test in
Nollan applied only to the relationship between the land use regulation implemented by
the permit and the permit condition itself, the so-called second inquiry. That test did not
apply to the relationship between the impact and the exaction, the third inquiry. See
Department of Trans. v. Lundberg, 825 P.2d 641, 646 (Or. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
467 (1992).
192. Dolan, 832 P.2d at 856.
193. Id.
194. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 438.
195. Id. at 442-43.
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the owner of an economically viable use of the property.' Since
the Dolans had not challenged the City's findings, the court found an
essential nexus between the increase in traffic congestion due to
development of the site and the alternative forms of transporta-
tion."9 Similarly, the exaction was held reasonably related to the
expansion of the business.' 9 The court also rejected the Dolans'
claim that the exactions constituted a per se taking because the
dedication would result in a permanent, physical occupation of their
property.'"
The dissent agreed that the exaction served a legitimate state
purpose,2" but found that the City's plan to complete its proposed
system, by acquiring the easements, did not justify why the property
owner should bear the burden.2"' If a mere showing of a legitimate
public need was enough, then there was no need for the relationship
prong, no matter what standard was applied.2  Rejecting the
"'magic words'" from each successive Supreme Court decision,2 3
the dissent held that "[i]f in fact the government needs to take part
of a landowner's property because of intensified uses of the developed
property, imposing the burden of showing precisely why the need in
fact exists is a modest burden to place on the government. Such
precision is lacking in this order."2 4
196. The Parks court, in rejecting the exaction, held there was no rational relationship
to any public purpose related to the development's impacts. Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d
646, 653 (9th Cir. 1983).
197. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443.
198. Id.
199. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 441 n.8. In rejecting this argument, the court cited Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). in which the Court held that" '[t]he government effects
a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation
of his land.'" Dolan, 854 P.2d at 441 n.8 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 527). Since Mrs. Dolan
could withdraw her application for a development permit, the occupation could only occur
with her permission and therefore was not a per se taking. Id.
200. Id. at 445 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 447 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Peterson, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 449 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Peterson, J., dissenting).
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B. The U.S. Supreme Court
Following her husband's death, Mrs. Dolan filed a petition for
writ of certiorari. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the nexus analysis required a more precise
relationship between the burdens caused and the exactions sought.2'
First, the Court noted in dictum that if the City had simply required
Mrs. Dolan to dedicate the land without tying it to the redevelopment
of the property, Tigard would have taken Mrs. Dolan's property in an
inverse condemnation. 7 But Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed the
police power of local government to restrict land use and reduce
property values without compensation.2 ' s The majority adopted the
Agins test that a land use regulation is valid if it "'substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land.' ,
The Court then distinguished these tests from the present case.
Mrs. Dolan applied for a building permit to develop a single parcel,
not for a change in zoning.21 Nor did Mrs. Dolan appeal from a
use restriction, but from a permit approval predicated on an exac-
tion.2 1' Applying the Nollan test, the Court found the first
prong-essential nexus-easily satisfied." Preventing the flooding
of Fanno Creek and reducing traffic congestion through alternative
modes are both legitimate public purposes that satisfy the essential
nexus test between "legitimate state interest" and the exaction sought
by the City.
213
In Nollan the Court found the essential nexus lacking, so it did
not address the exact nature of the relationship between the exaction
205. Petitioner Brief, supra note 129, at ii.
206. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1994).
207. Id. at 2316. The Court noted that removing the right to exclude others from her
property would deprive Mrs. Dolan of" 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2317-18.
213. Id.
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and the impact of the development. 2t 4 To determine the applicable
standard, the Court turned to state law.
215
1. Developing the test
a. any rational basis
The Court first examined a challenge to a Montana zoning
ordinance requiring dedication of at least one-ninth of all proposed
subdivisions, excluding roads, for public parks and playgrounds.
216
The property owner challenged this statute as an act of eminent
domain under the guise of the police power. 7 The Supreme Court
of Montana held that the standard of reasonableness used to evaluate
the exercise of police power required an elastic and progressive
application, not bound by the limits of precedent.2 '8 As in Nollan
the court noted that the act of seeking approval of a subdivision plat
was voluntary, and the City could impose any reasonable condition on
the privilege of recording the plat.2 9 Applying a strict standard of
review, the court upheld the statute because (1) the plaintiff intro-
duced no evidence rebutting the presumption of validity, and (2) any
rational basis is all that is required to uphold a legislative act.220
The Montana court indirectly cited Ayres v. City Council of Los
Angeles"~' for the proposition that a local government may require
the developer of a subdivision to provide streets necessitated by the
increase in activity due to the development.' The Yellowstone
County regulation would have gone too far, however, if it required
dedication of a major thoroughfare whose primary benefit was to the
entire community instead of subdivision residents.'
214. Id. at 2317. Nollan recognized that: "'[A] use restriction may constitute a
"taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government
purpose.'" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,834 (1987) (quoting Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,127 (1978)) (alteration in original).
215. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
216. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
217. Id. at 184.
218. Id. at 186.
219. Id. at 186-87.
220. Id. at 188.
221. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
222. Billings Properties, 394 P.2d at 188 (citing Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,
34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949)).
223. Id.
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The Chief Justice rejected this standard, finding it "too lax to
adequately protect petitioner's right to just compensation if her
property is taken for a public purpose." 4
b. specific and uniquely attributable
The Court next looked at a very exacting standard, first devel-
oped in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Pros-
pect.' In Pioneer Trust the plaintiff sought to record a plat subdi-
viding the property into approximately 250 residential units. 6 The
plat conformed with all municipal requirements except that it failed
to dedicate six and seven-tenths acres for public use.22'
The Illinois Supreme Court had previously considered the statute
for narrowly tailored exactions, once upholding a requirement that a
subdivider install curbs and gutters along the street, and once
striking down an in lieu fee provision for educational facilities. 9
In the latter case the court referred to the distinction in Ayres while
holding that "it does not follow that communities may use ...
[approval of a subdivision plat] to solve all of the problems which
they can foresee."'
In rejecting Mount Prospect's condition precedent for approval
of the plat, the Pioneer Trust court found that the village's schools
were already near capacity.31 This was not a result of the planned
subdivision.' Either the village could have developed more slowly,
or the school system expanded more rapidly, so that the need for
educational facilities would not be "specifically and uniquely
attributable" to the planned subdivision."3 The court explained its
standard:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to
the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider
is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then
224. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
225. 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961).
226. Id. at 800-01.
227. Id. at 800.
228. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1956).
229. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill 1960).
230. Id. at 234.
231. Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and
amounts to a confiscation of private property in contraven-
tion of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable
regulation under the police power.'
The Court rejected this direct proportionality test, holding that the
U.S. Constitution does not "require[ ] such exacting scrutiny.
'1)35
c. reasonable relationship
The Court next looked to the approach adopted by a majority of
states, which required a "reasonable relationship" between the
exaction and the impact.36 In Simpson v. City of North Platte, 7
the Nebraska Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance that
required anyone seeking to erect or enlarge a structure to dedicate
land for use as a public street to the full width required by the
comprehensive plan. 8  The Nebraska Supreme Court based its
decision on the Nebraska takings clause: "'The property of no person
shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation
therefor."' 9 Moreover, the court applied a "reasonable relation-
ship" test. 40 If the dedication had a nexus to the planned property
use, it constituted a valid exercise of the police power.24 If, howev-
er, the landowner's application was "merely being used as an excuse
for taking property, 2 42 then it was a compensable act of inverse
condemnation.243 In order to be reasonable, the relationship had to
be "'substantial, demonstrably clear and present.' ,21
Here the court found that the dedication constituted a form of
"'land banking"' to preserve the open land for possible future
extension of the dead-end street in question, a requirement unrelated
234. Id.
235. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
236. Id. at 2318-19.
237. 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
238. i at 299.
239. Id. at 300 (quoting NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21).




244. Id. (quoting 181 Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 336 A.2d 501,506 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1975)).
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to the development of the site.45 The court found that the varianc-
es in the ordinance were too "severe and unusual" to rescue the
ordinance. 46
Similar reasoning led the Wisconsin Supreme Court to uphold in
lieu fees assessed to a developer in Jordan v. Village of Memomonee
Falls.247 Within the newly platted subdivisions, the village ordinance
required the developer to dedicate land for schools, parks, and
recreational needs.2' If the dedication was "not feasible or compat-
ible with the comprehensive plan,"'249 the ordinance assessed a fee
of $200 per residential site7 0 The developers challenged the fee as
an unconstitutional taking without compensation, but the court
concluded that the municipality could condition plat approval upon
the subdivider's supplying all necessary improvements, including
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks, and playgrounds."
The court held that the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test
that the Illinois Supreme Court applied in Pioneer Trus2 12 was an
acceptable yardstick if not interpreted to impose too great a burden
of proof on the City,"3 preferring a "reasonable connection"
standard.'
Finding that in most instances the City could not prove that a
particular subdivision uniquely generated a need for a new park or
245. Id. The New Jersey court rejected an exaction for future improvements. "'Such
dedication must be for specific and presently contemplated immediate improvements-not
for the purpose of "banking" the land for use in a projected but unscheduled possible
future use.'" Id. (citing 181 Inc., 336 A.2d at 506).
246. Id.
247. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
248. Id. at 444.
249. Id.
250. Id. The ordinance assessed $120 per lot for schools and $80 per lot for
recreational facilities. Id.
251. Id. at 448.
252. 176 N.E.2d at 802.
253. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
254. Id. at 448. The court stated the reasonableness test for the application of the
police power:
The municipality by approval of .a proposed subdivision plat enables the
subdivider to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home building
sites and thus realizing a greater price than could have been obtained if he had
sold his property as unplatted lands. In return for this benefit the municipality
may require him to dedicate part of his platted land to meet a demand to which
the municipality would not have been put but for the influx of people into the
community to occupy the subdivision lots.
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school site, the court determined that the City could show that a
group of subdivisions, over a period of years, cumulatively created a
need for a park or school 55 In the absence of contravening evi-
dence, the court found this cumulative effect sufficient to justify the
exaction or an in lieu fee. 6 Although the court held the exaction
was reasonable, the Village could not exercise its police power under
the Wisconsin Constitution 7 unless expressly authorized by the
legislature." If a subdivision was too small to justify dedication of
land for a school, the court held that it was inequitable to completely
release the subdivider from the obligation5 9 The fee was neither
a tax nor a special assessment, but rather an equalization fee that
allowed equal treatment of all subdivisions, regardless of their
size.2r
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a similar subdivision
exaction in Collis v. Bloomington.261 The appeal was solely a facial
challenge to a state enabling statute that authorized municipalities to
condition subdivision approval on dedication of land for parks and
playgrounds, and to the city ordinance that implemented the statute
by requiring the dedication of ten percent of the proposed subdivi-
sion, or an in lieu fee.262 The court upheld the ordinance under the
federal Takings Clause and the corresponding section of the Minneso-
ta Constitution. 63 In adopting the Jordan test264 of a reasonable
relationship between the dedication and the burden,265 the court
noted that a subdivider is not "defending hearth and home against the
255. Id. at 447.
256. Id.
Possible contravening evidence would be a showing that the municipality prior
to the opening up of the subdivisions, acquired sufficient lands for school, park
and recreational purposes to provide for future anticipated needs including such
influx, or that the normal growth of the municipality would have made necessary
the acquisition irrespective of the influx caused by opening of subdivisions.
Id. at 448.
257. WIs. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
258. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 449-50 (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.45 (West 1987)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 450.
261. 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976).
262. Id. at 21.
263. Id. at 27-28. "Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public
use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
264. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
265. See Collis, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
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king's intrusion," but is a "manufacturer, processor, and marketer of
a product... simply attempting to maximize his profits from the sale
of a finished product.",266 The court regarded a subdivision without
streets, lights, storm drains, and other conveniences as a defective
product, one that posed a greater threat to a municipality than
defective consumer goods.267
The separate issue of the ten percent dedication caused greater
concern.2" A subdivision of homes on large lots would create a far
smaller burden on the city's infrastructure than high rise apartments
constructed on the same property.2 69 Nonetheless, the court found
that the language of both the ordinance and the enabling statute,
which only proposed the ten percent as a general yardstick,"'
allowed judicial review of the exaction and was therefore facially
constitutional.27'
On a similar set of facts, the Texas Supreme Court upheld an in
lieu fee as a condition to subdivision plat approval in City of College
Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.272 The ordinance required that the City
collect fees to establish an account for acquisition or development of
a neighborhood park. 3 Unless the City spent these fees within two
years, the ordinance required the City to grant the developers a
refund.274 The developer, Turtle Rock, challenged the fees under
the Texas Constitution's takings provision.275 The court recognized
that "[t]here is ... no one test and no single sentence rule .... The
need to adjust the conflicts between private ownership of property
266. Id. at 25 (quoting John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 923 (1967)).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 27.
269. Id.
270. The ordinance stated that "as a general rule, it is reasonable to require an amount
of land equal in value to ten percent of the undeveloped land proposed to be subdivided."
Id. at 21 (citing BLOOMINGTON, MINN., CODE § 20.09 II B).
271. Id. at 27-28.
272. 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
273. Id. at 804.
274. Id.
275. "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to
public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such
person. .. ." TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 17.
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and the public's interests is a very old one which has produced no
single solution."76
The lower court had held all exactions for park land per se
invalid since it did not believe parks were necessarily beneficial to a
neighborhood. 7  The exactions, therefore, lacked a "substantial
relation to the safety and health of the community."278 The state
supreme court held that in addition to this nexus requirement, a
constitutionally valid exaction had to be reasonable, not arbitrary.27 9
In finding that the ordinance met both prongs, the court first relied
on persuasive holdings from other states declaring park land
dedication as a valid exercise of the police power." ° The lower
court relied on an earlier decision holding such exactions unconstitu-
tional,"8 but the supreme court distinguished that case as violative
of the second prong.' The ordinance in question had no provisions
requiring the City to spend the in lieu fee on land or improvements
near the development-a benefit to the ultimate home buyers-nor
did the ordinance place a time limit on the use of the fees exact-
ed. 3 Therefore, the exaction was unconstitutional as arbitrary and
unreasonable; with no limits on how or when the City could spend the
fees collected, the function was more a tax than an assessment under
the police power.2" Since the dedication did not render the entire
property "wholly useless" or cause "total destruction" of the economic
value of the entire tract, there was no taking.8 5 The court summa-
rizes its reasonable connection test as a balance between need and
benefit that will ensure the subdivision receives a beneficial use of the
exaction. The court cites as examples of evidentiary consider-
276. College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 804 (quoting City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d
389, 391 (Tex. 1978)).
277. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 666 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
278. Id.
279. College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 805.
280. Id.
281. Id. (noting Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980)).
282. Berg De. Co., 603 S.W.2d 273 (finding the Missouri City ordinance invalid as
unreasonable and arbitrary).
283. College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 805-06.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 806 (citing Teague, 570 S.W.2d at 393).
286. Id. at 807.
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ations the "size of lots in the subdivision, the economic impact on the
subdivision, [and] the amount of open land consumed by the
development."2"
Requiring a deposit of exaction fees into the municipality's
general fund did not disturb the Utah Supreme Court in Call v. City
of West Jordan. s The court found that use of the funds for the
stated purpose was assured by the good faith of the public officials,
and that collection of funds for a specified purpose automatically
creates a special trust within the general fund in favor of the
designated benefit.289
The West Jordan ordinance required that the developer dedicate
seven percent of the land in a subdivision, or its equivalent value in
lieu, for flood control or public parks.2  The court upheld this
provision, in addition to exactions for sewers and other improvements.
The court justified its ruling by comparing the slums and ghettos of
inner cities, which lack public parks, to the enriched life of those cities
with numerous parks, plazas, recreational, and cultural areas.29'
In modem times of ever-increasing population and
congestion, real estate developers buy land at high prices.
From the combined pressures of competition and desire for
gain, they often squeeze every lot they can into some
labyrinthian plan, with only the barest minimum for tortious
and circuitous streets, without any arterial ways through such
subdivisions, and with little or no provision for parks,
recreation areas, or even for reasonable "elbow room." The
need for some general planning and control is apparent, and
makes manifest the wisdom underlying the delegation of
powers to the cities ....292
In evaluating the dedication provision, the court reasoned that
"the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the
needs created by the subdivision."293 Although the ordinance would
result in benefits to both the subdivision and the community of West
287. Id.
288. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
289. Id. at 220.
290. Id. at 218.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 219.
293. Id. at 220.
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Jordan, the court found that the ordinance met the reasonable
relationship requirement.' 4
Finally, in Parks v. Watson,295 a developer, seeking vacation of
platted streets within a proposed apartment project, challenged the
Klamath Falls City Council's contingent dedication of a twenty-foot
strip along the main thoroughfare.' 9 The developer was willing to
pay a negotiated fee of one dollar per square foot for the vacated
property, but the dispute turned on ownership of the easement.2"
Parks agreed to grant an easement for purposes of widening the
road."'8 However, the city sought a dedication in order to acquire
fee simple ownership of an existing geothermal well on the strip.2
The developer planned to use the well to heat the new apartment
complex.3"
The developer brought suit under the Civil Rights Act and
sections one and two of the Sherman Act." The civil rights action,
in part, involved a takings claim.3" The court held that a "condition
requiring an applicant for a governmental benefit to forgo a constitu-
tional right is unlawful if the condition is not rationally related to the
benefit conferred.""3 3 Finding that street vacation cases are analo-
gous to subdivision exaction cases,304 the court rejected the city's
action, finding no rational relationship between the vacation of the
platted streets and the required transfer of ownership in the geother-
mal well. 0 5
294. Id.
295. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
296. Id. at 649-50.
297. Id. at 649.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 650.
300. Id. at 649-50.
301. Id. at 649. The Civil Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and the
Sherman Antitrust Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The antitrust claim charged
the city's action was an attempt to monopolize the geothermal heating market. Parks, 716
F.2d at 650. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the developer lacked standing because the developer could not establish an injury to
its business or property. Id. at 657-58. The court of appeals remanded for consideration
of harm not merely to Klamath's potential off-site geothermal heating business, but also
the harm to the potential sale of energy to the planned apartment complex. Id. at 662.
302. Parks, 716 F.2d at 662.
303. Id. at 652.
304. Id. at 653.
305. Id.
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Dissenting from the majority's reversal of the trial court's
dismissal of the section 1983 claims, Judge Wallace found that
aggressive negotiation for the transfer of government property was
justified under Honolulu Rapid Transit?6  In Honolulu Rapid
Transit a contract for the sale of the local bus company was upheld
even though the City was not required to pay just compensation.0 7
Judge Wallace believed there was no takings issue involved, as the
government may bargain aggressively "with 'due regard for [its] own
interest.' ,,"0 Judge Wallace dismissed the Parks majority's distinc-
tion that Honolulu Rapid Transit involved a condition directly related
to the subject of the benefit.3" The majority not only agreed that
the City was free to negotiate aggressively, but failed to object to
Klamath Falls charging two and a half times more per square foot
than it customarily did for street vacation." The City could have
simply charged enough for the street vacation to condemn the
geothermal well with money left over.311 The City could similarly
require the developer to construct street lights or other projects that
would benefit the City directly. 2 Thus, Judge Wallace rejected the
distinction between geothermal wells and street lights and considered
each concession equally valid under Honolulu Rapid Transit as an
exercise of the government's role as a market participant.313
2. Application to the Dolan site
In Dolan the Chief Justice found that a reasonable relationship
standard was the most closely aligned with constitutional require-
ments. 4 To avoid confusion with the rational basis test of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court coined the term "rough propor-
306. Id. at 665 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Dolim,
459 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972)).
307. Honolulu Rapid Transit, 459 F.2d at 552-53.
308. Parks, 716 F.2d at 665 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (quoting Albrecht v. United States,
329 U.S. 599, 604 (1947)).
309. Id. at 655.
310. Id. at 666-67.
311. Id. at 667.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
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tionality" for the new prong of its takings analysis.3"5 The majority
then shifted the traditional burden of proof from the applicant,
requiring the municipality to demonstrate the rough proportionality
between the dedication and the nature and extent of the proposed
development." 6  While not requiring a "precise mathematical
calculation, 31 7 the Court did require the City to make "some sort
of individualized determination."31 8
Next, the Chief Justice turned to the dedication required of Mrs.
Dolan.319 The Court conceded that the City had a legitimate
interest in restricting development on the floodplain.32' The flood-
plain dedication was within the fifteen percent greenway space already
required under the City's ordinance. 2  However, the Court ques-
tioned the City's demand for a dedication that would create a public
right-of-way.
32
While the City conceded that recreational access to the floodplain
easement was merely ancillary to the primary goal of limiting
destructive floods, the Court found no nexus to support the public
easement.3" Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the City
demanded more than a prohibition on building on the floodplain
bordering Fanno Creek, the City wanted access for public use.324
This violated Mrs. Dolan's valuable right to exclude others from her
property.32 Commercial use of the property did not diminish the
315. Id. The term "rough proportionality" was reportedly coined by Justice Scalia
during oral argument. Paul D. Kamenar, A Quest for an Invigorated Takings Clause, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 26, 1994 (Supreme Court 1993-94 Term Supp.), at 7.
316. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20, 2320 n.8.
317. Id. at 2319.
318. l
319. Id. at 2320.
320. Id. The City's interest arose from the increase in the impervious surface on the
property-by paving the parking lot and increasing the square footage of the store-which
would cause increased storm-water runoff from the site. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2320-21.
324. Id. at 2320.
325. Id. The Chief Justice cited Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
In Kaiser Aetna the petitioner dredged a private lagoon and a channel through an adjacent
beach to create a private marina. Id. at 165-66. The Court held that although connecting
the new marina to the ocean had created a navigational servitude, thus subjecting future
actions to approval by the Army Corps of Engineers, the servitude did not create a right
of public access without just compensation. Id. at 179-80. While the public has free access
to navigable waters, the owner of this formerly private pond could not lose the valuable
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strength of this right.326 If the new construction impinged on an
existing public greenway space, then the City could require Mrs.
Dolan to dedicate land as a replacement greenway.327 But the
Court held that the City had failed to establish a reasonable relation-
ship between the public easement and the expansion of the hardware
store.32
Next the Court accepted the City's finding that the development
would increase traffic within the district at the rate of approximately
435 additional trips daily.329 The Chief Justice held that traditional
dedications for relief from congestion such as "streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways are generally reasonable.""33 However, the Court
determined that the City's finding that the bikepath could offset some
of the traffic was insufficient to justify the exaction.33' In remanding
the case the Court concluded that "[n]o precise mathematical calcu-
lation is required, but the City must make some effort to quantify its




Justice Souter found no need to expand on Nollan's essential
nexus test, that an exaction must have a reasonable relationship to the
adverse impact of the proposed development.333 The majority
acknowledged that flood control was a sufficient justification for the
right to exclude others except by an act of eminent domain. Id. at 175-80. However, the
Court did note that the government could have conditioned its approval on the petitioner's
complying with measures that would promote navigation; however, it could only do so
prospectively, not retrospectively. Id. at 179-80.
326. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. The City contended that the public easement would not
impair the value of the commercial property. Id. (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)). But the Court distinguished PruneYard, which required a
major shopping mall to allow individuals to distribute pamphlets and solicit signatures on
petitions because the mall could place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
the individuals. Id. Mrs. Dolan, however, would lose all right to control the actions of
individuals if required to dedicate a public easement. Id. at 2320-21.




331. Id. at 2321-22.
332. Id. at 2322.
333. Id. at 2330-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
284 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:247
City to require dedication of land bordering Fanno Creek.3" But
in rejecting the exaction for public recreational facilities on the flood
control easement, Justice Souter did not find that the majority was
applying any proportionality test.335 The majority's test was actually
the Nollan analysis, that the justification for the bike path hinged on
the essential nexus between the traffic congestion caused by the
redevelopment of the site and the bike path's ability to relieve that
congestion.336
According to Justice Souter the City failed to meet the majority's
nexus analysis because it used "could" instead of "would" when
describing the bike path's potential offset of increased traffic
congestion. 37 Had Tigard found that the bike path would offset the
increased traffic, even to some extent, it would have satisfied the
relationship requirement.338 Reviewing the record, Justice Souter
felt that the City had met this test by establishing in its Comprehen-
sive Plan that "' "[b]icycle and pedestrian pathway systems will result
in some reduction of automobile trips within the community."' , 39
This finding satisfied the traditional test that exactions for street
expansion are valid if they relieve increased congestion caused by
planned development."' Justice Souter concluded by rejecting the
majority's shifting of the burden of proof to the municipality and its
expansion on the Nollan test.34 Almost as a postscript he added,
"[t]he right test for the enunciation of takings doctrine seems hard to
spot.
,342
334. Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
337. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Respondent Brief, supra note 125, at
A-5 (quoting Tigard, Or., Comprehensive Plan at 1-221)).
340. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("'[Tjhe common zoning regulations
requiring subdividers to... dedicate certain areas to public streets, are in accord with our
constitutional traditions because the proposed property use would otherwise be the cause
of excessive congestion.' ")).
341. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
342. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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4. Stevens's dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, noted
that the majority's decision would have a great impact. 43 First, the
Court agreed that both exactions-for flood control and traffic
demand mitigation-fulfilled Nollan's essential nexus test.3'
However, the two new hurdles posed-the rough proportionality
between the harm caused and the benefit derived, and the shifting of
the burden to the municipality-had no precedent in the dozen cases
cited.45 The reasonable relationship test the majority cited is, for
all intents and purposes, the essential nexus test, not the rough
proportionality test adopted by, the majority.3' The state court
cases also emphasize the benefit the developer received in exchange
for the dedication, a concept the Chief Justice overlooked.47 These
same cases also look at the impact on the entire parcel, either a
dedication of a minor percentage of the land, or its in lieu equivalent,
rather than individual property rights from the whole bundle.'
None of the cases, for example, found the Kaiser Aetna right to
exclude determinative, or even considered it. 9 And even restric-
tions on that right to exclude fail to rise to the level of a constitution-
al taking "unless they 'unreasonably impair the value or use' of the
property."35 Justice Stevens concluded that essential nexus is the
correct standard, and that the inquiry should go beyond that "only if
the developer establishes that a concededly germane condition is so
grossly disproportionate to the proposed development's adverse
effects that it manifests motives other than land use regulation on the
part of the city."35'
Maintaining the Court's traditional burden on the petitioner, Mrs.
Dolan failed to show that public recreational use of the easement
created any burden on property used for a large hardware store.352
343. Id. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 2324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
350. i at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-84).
351. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
352. Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens also found that the majority's word play-of "could"
and "would"-that it used to deny the bikepath was a form of federal
court micromanaging of state land use decisions that could-or
would-cause a flood of new litigants.
35 3
The dissent next challenged the Court's mixing of the substantive
due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment with the
Takings Clause of the Fifth." In cases involving a physical invasion
of property, combining the two has little effect.355 Regulatory
takings cases pose a much greater risk of "potentially open-ended
sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regula-
tions,"356 as in the line of cases following the Lochner decision.357
In conclusion Justice Stevens noted that uncertainty will always
characterize predictions of the future impact of development on all
aspects of urban life.358  The interests of private developers must
give way to the greater public interest in mitigating or eliminating
potential impacts.359 The burden should remain on the developer
to demonstrate that exactions have "unreasonably impaired the
economic value of the proposed improvement. ' '31 Thus, "[i]f the
government can demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a
land-use permit are rational, impartial and conducive to fulfilling the
aims of a valid land-use plan, a strong presumption of validity should
attach to those conditions. "361
353. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 2326-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
355. Md at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
357. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
Justice Stevens compared the Dolan majority's refusal to recognize the sufficient nexus
between the proposed site development and increased flood and traffic problems with the
Lochner majority's refusal to find a nexus between the regulation in question and the
state's interest in protecting human health. lit (Stevens, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 2329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
360. IM. at 2330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 2329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE DOLAN TEST AND TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but
with the great increase and concentration of population,
problems have developed, and constantly are developing,
which require, and will continue to require, additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom,
necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing
conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, proba-
bly would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppres-
sive.36
The Euclid3" Court could never have looked seventy years into
the future to see the problems cities currently face. They would be
unlikely to see "the wisdom, necessity and validity" of some modem
exactions. Future courts will likely find the Dolan majority's limits on
transportation "arbitrary and oppressive.""
The majority in Dolan365 accepted the floodplain exaction as
reasonably related and roughly proportionate to the potential flooding
caused by increased runoff from the more intensively developed
site.3" Tigard can require Mrs. Dolan to leave the land as a
greenway, undeveloped, but it can not require her to allow the City
to use the parcel as a pedestrian and bike path.367 That would
require proof from the City that the use of the bike path would
roughly offset the increased automobile traffic generated by the larger
hardware store.3 8
The City could have denied the permit instead of granting
conditional approval,369 theoretically avoiding years of litigation. If
cities deny applications of problematic developments, without acting
arbitrarily or capriciously, until the developer proposes the dedica-
362. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
363. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
364. Id. at 387.
365. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
366. Id. at 2317-18.
367. Id. at 2320-22.
368. Id. at 2321-22.
369. Id. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tions the city seeks, then cities may avoid the Dolan complications
altogether. Shifting the burden from the developer to the municipali-
ty may fundamentally affect the process, or it may simply generate
greater expense-more experts and more studies. But each city
should not have to prepare its own study on the ability of bike paths
to reduce automobile traffic and congestion anymore than the Court
would require each city to prepare an individual study on the ability
of adult theaters to degrade neighborhoods.3 7  Tigard clearly
established the positive effects of bike paths, and their ability to
alleviate some of the negative impact of increased automobile use."'
Mrs. Dolan did not contest the development fees Tigard imposed
on her project.372 The City's general plan required developers to
pay for bus pads and other transportation enhancements if the
development created a need for the improvements. 373 Given that
the new store would generate 435 additional car trips per day,374 had
the Comprehensive Plan called for an extra traffic lane adjacent to the
site, or a turn bay for ingress to and egress from the site, the Court
would likely have upheld an exaction of as much land as sought for
the bike path. But if the Court would allow an exaction for an
automobile lane, it would need to expand the analysis to general
traffic congestion created and all the possible ways to alleviate it.
Cities need the flexibility to design creative local and regional
solutions to growth, and the Court should not press them into seeking
dedications for street expansion as the only relief for increased
development.
370. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
371. See Amicus Brief on the Bicycle-Pedestrian Pathway Dedication by the Rails-to-
Trails Conservancy, et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518)
[hereinafter Rails-To-Trails Amicus Briefl. The brief noted that projected population
growth and existing traffic congestion contributed to the region's non-attainment status for
ozone and carbon monoxide under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (1988). Rails
to Trials Amicus Brief, supra at 6-8. The brief further cited statistics that more than 30
million Americans ride a bike regularly and that bicycling is faster than driving a car or
riding a bus for trips under three miles. Id. at 14 (citing Michael Everett, Consumer
Demand for Bicycle Transportation in the United States, 28 TRAFFIc Q. 585, 585 (1974).
In addition, the brief detailed the increase in shopping trips and commuting by bicycle
after the construction of dedicated bike paths. Id. at 14-18.
372. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 439 (1993).
373. Rails-to-Trails Amicus Brief, supra note 371, at 11 (citing CDC, supra note 141,
ch. 18.120.180.12 (1983)).
374. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
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From Justice Holmes37 forward, the Court has implicitly
acknowledged that takings law is based in policy, not a fixed
calculation.376 The Court needs to allow flexibility for local city
planners and transportation officials in designing remedies to the
impacts of development. If the basis of land use regulation is
nuisance law, if no one may use property so as to negatively impact
the property of others, then takings law must begin with social
responsibility.
V. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
The tragedy of the commons is that, in times of dwindling
resources, each individual will increase, not decrease, use of those
resources.377 Enclosure, first in Britain and later in the colonies,
signalled an end to the common weal and a rise in the status of land
as property, freely alienable.378 Enclosure brings about "a new
ecological order." '379 As with the land, the environment itself
becomes a commodity.38
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment issued a report, Our Common Future (The Brundtland
Report).38' The report posited a future in which elimination of
375. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
376. The Court in Dolan could only create a rough proportionality test. Dolan, 114 S.
Ct. at 2319-20 ("No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the development."). Justice Souter found the definition
of a taking elusive. Id. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The right case for the enunciation
of takings doctrine seems hard to spot.").
377. The commons were the original open lands used communally for grazing and
agriculture. This theory was explored by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons,
166 SCIENCE 1243-48 (1968), reprinted in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
2-11 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975).
378. THE ECOLOGIST, WHOSE COMMON FUTURE: RECLAIMING THE COMMONS (1993).
The concept of the "commonwealth" lives on in the official designations of four
states-Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-and one territory-Puerto
Rico-as commonwealths. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 166-67 (1972).
379. THE ECOLOGIST, supra note 378, at 60 (quoting Ivan Illich, Silence is a Commons,
COEVOLUTION Q. (Winter 1983)).
380. Id.
381. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE, (Oxford Univ. Press 1987). The work is commonly known as the Brundtland
Report after the commission's chair, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.
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poverty and decaying urban environments could only be achieved
through worldwide growth.3 2 A response to that report challenged
the rate of growth in gross national product, estimated at five and
nine-tenths percent per annum, as unsustainable environmentally.
383
Holding it unlikely that the environment can sustain a doubling of the
world's economy, let alone the five to ten times urged by the
Brundtland Report,3 " Robert Goodland urged that we must acceler-
ate our technical improvements in resource productivity,385 a change
that can only occur as a shift from a reliance on growth to sustainable
progress.
3 6
Sustainability has become the buzzword of the 1990s.87 As a
society we must see our current levels of consumption as inherently
unsustainable.3s Yet during the period 1960 to 1990, the percentage
of workers commuting in private vehicles grew from sixty-eight to
Development, as used in this report, grew from post-World War II references to
"underdeveloped nations." See, e.g., President Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address (Jan.
20, 1949), in 5 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN 112, 114 '(1964) ("[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas.").
382. The Bruntland Report, supra note 381, at 65.
383. ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BUILDING ON
BRUNDTLAND 9-12 (Robert Goodland et al. eds., 1991).
384. Id. at 16.'
385. Id. at 24.
386. Id. at 95.
387. J. Eugene Grigsby III, Rules for "Sustainable Development" Must be Socially
Inclusive, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at D2 (" 'Sustainable development' is a hot topic
among architects, planners and a new breed of business leaders.").
In 1993 President Clinton established the President's Council on Sustainable
Development, Exec. Order No. 12,852,58 Fed. Reg. 35,841 (1993). The Vision Statement
of the Council includes: "Protection of natural systems requires changed patterns of
consumption consistent with a steady improvement in the efficiency with which society
uses natural resources.... Sustainable development requires fundamental changes in the
conduct or government, private institutions, and individuals." The goals of the task force
on Energy and Transportation include reduced traffic congestion in urban areas and a
decrease in per capita vehicle miles traveled. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, INFORMATION PACKET (Mar. 1995).
Federal planning for sustainable growth includes the National Sciences and
Technology Council. See NATIONAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, BRIDGE TO
A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1995); NATIONAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL,
TECHNOLOGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTiON (1994),
388. In 1989 the United States produced one fifth of the world's total emissions of
carbon dioxide from industrial processes. HUEY D. JOHNSON, GREEN PLANS:
GREENPRINT FOR SUSTAINABILITY (1995).
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eighty-eight.38 9 Vehicle occupancy rates have fallen during the same
period for all travel uses, both business and pleasure.3" In 1990 the
United States emitted thirty-five percent of the carbon dioxide
generated by transportation.39  As of 1986 the United States had
the largest number of cars of any region of the world, as well as the
greatest number of cars per capita.39
The traditional solution to traffic congestion has been to
construct new roadways. This solution, however, is no
longer viable in many situations because of financial con-
straints, environmental restrictions, community opposition to
roadway expansion and changing traffic patterns. In fact, it
is well established that construction of additional roadways
often exacerbates congestion by making travel by automobile
more accessible.393
Congressional intent to alter our direction is found in the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA),394 briefly alluded to by the Dolan majority.395 ISTEA
alters the national goals of paving roads to the horizon, found in the
early Interstate Highway acts. Instead of interstates, we now have the
"National Intermodal Transportation System." The policy statement
begins:
It is the policy of the United States Government to develop
a National Intermodal Transportation System that is
economically efficient and environmentally sound, provides
the foundation for the United States to compete in the
global economy, and will move individuals and property in
an energy efficient way.
389. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTY-FOURTh ANNUAL REPORT 270
(1993).
390. Id. at 271.
391. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT
1972-1992 (Mostafa K. Tolba et al. eds., 1992).
392. Id. at 412.
393. Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth
Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America's Major Quality of Life
Crisis, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 915, 926 (1991).
394. Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240,105 Stat. 1914
(codified as amended in scattered section of 23, 49, and other titles of the U.S.C.).
395. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 (1994).
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... The National Intermodal Transportation System
shall consist of all forms of transportation in a unified,
interconnected manner, including the transportation systems
of the future, to reduce energy consumption and air pollu-
tion while promoting economic development and supporting
the United States' preeminent position in international
commerce.
... The National Intermodal Transportation System
must be operated and maintained with insistent attention to
the concepts of innovation, competition, energy efficiency,
productivity, growth, and accountability. Practices that
resulted in the lengthy and overly costly construction of the
Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense
Highways must be confronted and stopped."
Section 1007 of ISTEA allows funds previously authorized for
highway construction to be diverted to other projects, including
"[c]arpool projects, fringe and corridor parking facilities and pro-
grams, and bicycle transportation and pedestrian walkways.""
Section 1033 allows use of National Highway System Funds, Federal
Lands Highway Funds, and federal funds for bridge construction and
maintenance for construction of bicycle transportation facilities and
pedestrian walkways.398 Bicycle transportation facilities are defined
as "new or improved lanes, paths, or shoulders for use by bicyclists,
traffic control devices, shelters, and parking facilities for bicycles., 399
A transportation corridor goes far beyond an interstate highway
system, encompassing such alternative forms as airports, canals, or
high-speed rail lines.4" At their best, such corridors are regional,
the focus of a comprehensive plan to manage the increasing conges-
tion which accompanies urban growth.40'
396. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 5501(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995).
397. 23 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. V 1993).
398. Id. at § 217.
399. Id. at § 217().
400. Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn, Transportation Corridors: Shaping and
Financing Urbanization Through Integration of Eminent Domain, Zoning and Growth
Management Techniques, 55 UMKC L. REV. 153, 165 (1987).
401. Id. at 167-68.
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Bicycles are the most energy-efficient form of transportation, as
well as one of the least polluting.' Oregon has long been a leader
in bikepath/greenway development, with plans similar to the planned
East Tujunga Wash-Los Angeles River Class I bikeway.4 3 Class I
bikepaths-those not only dedicated to bikes but completely separate
from the roadway-"significantly increase the percentage of bicycling
and walking commuter and other utilitarian trips, improve safety,
increase access, and promote intermodal travel."' Combining bike
and pedestrian-friendly rights-of-way can greatly increase use of both
options, relieving congestion on local arterials. 5  After Chicago
installed five Class I paths, commuter use of bikes rose from an area
average of one percent to a local use of almost sixteen percent.
406
In Portland, Oregon, more than 700 bicyclists purchased permits to
allow bikes on buses and light rail trains during the first three months
of the program. 7  The planned Brooklyn-Queens Greenway has
more than eighteen million dollars committed to develop a system
linking thirteen parks, four lakes, museums, and recreational facilities
in an uninterrupted path from the Atlantic Ocean to Long Island
Sound.4°
The City of Tigard has developed a comprehensive plan that links
its downtown to the outskirts by way of a Class I bikepath.4 9 The
route runs along Fanno Creek, cutting through Mrs. Dolan's
402. Ryan Snyder, Bicycles in Ecological Cities, 4 EARTHWORD 6.
403. Larry Smith, Combining Ecology and Transportation: The East Tujunga Wash-
L.A. River Bikeway/Greenway, 4 EARTHWORD 8.
404. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., THE NATIONAL BICYCLING AND WALKING STUDY:
TRANSPORTATION CHOICES FOR A CHANGING AMERICA 21 (1994). There are three
classes of bike paths:
Class I: Path for bicycles separated from motorized vehicles.
Class II: Bike lane on roads, usually designated by painted line and signs.
Motorized vehicles are permitted to use bike lanes to make turns and to park,
where it's allowed.
Class III: Bike route shared by bikes and motor vehicles, designated by signs.
Julie Sheer, Urban Riders: Bicycle Commuting in the Valley, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, at
B1 (Valley ed.).
405. Joel Woodhull, Link Between Transit and Land Use: The Pedestrian, 4
EARTHWORD 12.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 32.
408. CHARLES A. FLINK & ROBERT M. SEARNS, GREENWAYS: A GUIDE TO
PLANNING, DESIGN, AND DEVELOPMENT 108 (1993).
409. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
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property.410 Studies in other communities have shown that develop-
ment of Class I bikepaths has encouraged commuters and local
shoppers to use the path instead of the family car. The benefits to
the community range from less congestion and fuel consumption to
improved air quality and a more healthy populace. The state and
federal legislatures have acted to encourage such efforts; the executive
branch is committed to discovering and employing alternatives in
order to achieve a sustainable future. The Supreme Court should
relax its new rough proportionality test to allow intermodal transpor-
tation solutions. If a municipality shows that a new development will
increase traffic congestion, then the Court should allow flexibility in
exactions that will encourage city planners to explore all possible
solutions, not merely more roads and more highways.
VI. CONCLUSION
To the 1926 Euclid Court, apartment houses were a prospective
nuisance that zoning could prevent from penetrating single family
housing neighborhoods.4 ' Breweries, cedar trees, and low flying
planes are only nuisances under specific circumstances. 12 Yet each
was closed, destroyed, or liable for damages in specific circumstances.
We have long considered the car, most often the single occupant
vehicle, as the epitome of transportation. But when stuck in a
freeway traffic jam for hours, the auto seems as much a nuisance as
a brick yard413 or a gravel pit.
4 14
The courts must continue to safeguard private property from
regulatory takings. But as demands on the common wealth of
humankind, the environment, continue to grow, the absolute quantity
and nature of the sticks in the bundle of property rights must undergo
a fundamental change. The Court must consider expanding the
opportunities for city planners to make our urban centers both livable
and sustainable communities. When a proposed development will
burden that community, the Court must allow a flexible approach to
ameliorating that burden. Even if the development's impact can only
be measured in number of car trips generated, the Court must allow
410. Id.
411. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
412. See supra notes 27-38.
413. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
414. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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the city to offset that increased congestion through all means at their
disposal, from futuristic technologies down to humble bike paths.
David Ackerly
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